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"SOMETHING OF A SPORT:" THE EFFECT OF SANDOVAL
ON TITLE IX DISPARATE IMPACT DISCRIMINATION SUITS
JONATHAN M.H. SHORT
INTRODUCTION

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits "exclusion from
participation in, denial of benefits of, and discrimination under
federally assisted programs on ground of race, color, or national
origin."' Through § 601, Congress intended that "no person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."2 To effectuate this deceptively simple
principle Congress created § 602, giving enforcement authority to
federal agencies.a These federal agencies, such as the Department
of Justice (DOJ), created regulations to enforce § 601. 4 According to
the DOJ regulations, a recipient' of federal financial assistance
shall neither "directly or through contractual or other
arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because
of their race, color, or national origin,"' nor "have the effect of
defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program as respects individuals of a particular
race, color, or national origin."7
Congress modeled Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 in a similar, if not identical, fashion to Title VI.8 Congress
provided, through § 901, that "[nlo person in the United States
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001).

2. Id.
3. Id. at § 2000d-1.
4. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2001) (this regulation, created by the DOJ, is a primary focus

of this Note).
5. The definitions of two important terms are required for this examination. First, a
recipient is the entity to which a federal funding agency grants resources. Second, a
beneficiary is the party for which the federal government grants those resources. The federal
government intends to benefit the beneficiary by granting those resources to the recipient. For
a thorough discussion of the definition of recipient and beneficiary under the DOJ regulations,
see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DmSION, COORDINATION AND

REVIEW SECTION, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 20-28 (Jan. 11, 2001), available at
http'/www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/vimanual.pdf [hereinafter TITLE VI MANUAL].
6. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2).
7. Id.
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2001).
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shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."9 Congress also created § 902, giving enforcement
authority to federal agencies. 0 These federal agencies, such as the
Department of Education (ED), created regulations to enforce §
901." According to the ED regulations, a recipient of federal
financial assistance shall not "administer or operate any test or
other criterion for admission which has a disproportionately adverse
effect on persons on the basis of sex." 2 ED promulgated these
regulations to ensure that Title IX would be effective.
In the recent Supreme Court case Alexander v. Sandoval, the
Court rejected the traditional practice of allowing private parties to
sue for enforcement of § 602 under a disparate impact
discrimination theory. 3 Accordingly, many have questioned
whether the holding in Sandoval will apply to cases brought under
other similar federal regulations 4 ; so far, it has." This Note will
focus on the impact of Sandoval on private disparate impact
lawsuits brought to enforce Title IX regulations.
Regulatory protection from disparate impact discrimination
under Title IX is especially important because it even extends to
educational programs that merely receive federal financial aid from
its students. 6 Fittingly, the way in which federal courts deal with
Title IX disparate impact discrimination in light of Sandoval will
have far-reaching consequences.
9. Id. (exceptions omitted).
10. Id. at § 1682 (exceptions omitted).
11. 34 C.F.R. § 106.21(b) (2001).
12. Id.

13. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (Scalia, J., writing for the Court, asserted
that there was one addressable issue in the case: "whether there is a private cause of action
to enforce the regulation." Id. at 279).
14. Shannon P. Duffy, 'EnvironmentalRacism'Ruling:Could Have Far-ReachingImpact,
N.J. L.J., Oct. 1, 2001; Joanna Grossman, The Supreme Court'sRecent DisparateImpact Case
and its Implicationsfor Gender Equity, FINDLAW'S LEGAL COMMENT., May 8, 2001, available
at httpJ/writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20010508.html; Edward Lazarus, The Case that
Roared: A Limited "DisparateImpact" Holding That Could Have Large Repercussions,
FINDLAW'S
LEGAL COMMENT.,
May 1, 2001,
available at
http:/writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20010501.html; Jill Leovy & Henry Weinstein, Bias
Decision Could Affect Wide Variety of Issues, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A24.
15. Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Reverses South Camden Case: Section 1983 Claim Not
a Viable Weapon, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 18, 2001; Shannon P. Duffy, Court Will Not
Rehear Camden Cement Plant Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 18, 2002 (both articles
concern South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection,274 F.3d 771 (2001)).
16. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 569 (1984).
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Section I of this Note will discuss the background of Title IX
enforcement. Sections II and III, will discuss the majority and
dissenting opinions of the Sandoval Court respectively. Section IV
will apply the current holding in Sandoval to Title IX, focusing on
recent cases in federal district courts around the country. Section
V will explore the options for plaintiffs in the post-Sandoval era.
SECTION I: BACKGROUND OF TITLE IX ENFORCEMENT

To understand the reasons behind private action suits to
enforce the regulations under both Titles VI and IX, it is important
to examine the procedural provisions of both. 7 These procedural
provisions enable the federal funding agencies to enforce § 602 and
§ 902 in the absence of a private action. This Section provides a
glimpse into the future of civil rights law by showing what will
remain for civil rights advocates as the federal courts apply the
holding in Sandoval more extensively, including to actions brought
to enforce § 902.'" This Section answers two questions: (1) how do
federal granting agencies enforce disparate impact regulations in
the absence of a private action; and (2) why did DOJ and ED develop
regulations that allowed a private right of action?
The Title IX procedures read as follows: "The procedural
provisions applicable to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are
hereby adopted and incorporated herein by reference. These
procedures may be found at 34 CFR 100.6-100.11 and 34 CFR, part
101."19
These regulations outline the requirements of the
administrative process in terminating the funding of recipients
found to have a disparate impact violation.2 ° These procedures are,
again, what agencies will be required to use when the private right
of action to enforce the regulations no longer exists.2
The
17. Due to this Note's focus on Title IX, the examination will be limited to those Title VI
regulations that involve education programs (i.e., discrimination in an education program on
the basis of race by a recipient of federal funds).
18. See Litman v. George Mason Univ., No. CA-97-1755-A, 2001 WL 902469 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 7, 2001) (holding that "although it specifically dealt with Title VI, the principles
underlying the holding in Sandoval logically limit the scope of private right of action to
enforce Title IX"); Communities for Equity v. Mich. High School Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:98-CV479 (W.D. Mich. Jul. 12, 2001) (order granting a motion to dismiss a private action brought
to enforce § 902 after the Sandoval case).
19. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71.
20. 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.6-100.11, part 101 (2001).
21. This assumes that while the Sandoval case may have settled the Title VI private right
of action issue, and by extension the Title IX private right of action issue, there may be other
private action options for victims of disparate impact discrimination to enforce the
regulations.
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procedures include extensive review by the federal funding agency
before the agency can enforce § 902 via the termination of funding.2 2
This examination is concerned only with the enforcement of §
902 after an agency receives a complaint or makes an allegation of
discrimination against a recipient. The procedure, as with any
other legal or administrative matter, begins by determining the
parties to the enforcement hearing. As the following demonstrates,
the procedures create two distinct sides: "(a) The term party shall
include an applicant or recipient or other person to whom a notice
of hearing or opportunity for hearing has been mailed naming him
a respondent. (b) The Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights of the
Department of Education, shall be deemed a party to all
proceedings."23 Those beneficiaries, prospective or otherwise,
affected by the disparate impact discrimination are not parties
during these hearings.2 4
Instead, ED is a party to § 902
enforcement, but does not technically represent those beneficiaries
affected by the discrimination.
There are other ways for affected parties to get involved in the
enforcement hearings: "Any interested person or organization may
file a petition to participate in a proceeding as an amicus curiae."25
However, amicus curiae status is not automatic: "The presiding
officer may grant the petition if he finds that the petitioner has a
legitimate interest in the proceedings, that such participation will
not unduly delay the outcome, and may contribute materially to the
proper disposition thereof."26 Furthermore, amicus curiae status
does not make an individual a party to the enforcement hearing:
"An amicus curiae is not a party and may not introduce evidence at
a hearing."27 Submitting a complaint under the regulatory scheme
does not make one a party to the enforcement proceeding: "A person
submitting a complaint pursuant to § 100.7(b) of this title is not a
party to the proceedings governed by this part, but may petition,
after proceedings are initiated, to become an amicus curiae."28
22. See especially 34 C.F.R. pt. 101 (2001). For DOJ guidance on procedures, as provided
to federal funding agencies, see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS
DIVISION, COORDINATION AND REVIEW SECTION, TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL 131-51 (Jan. 11,

2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/ixlegal.pdf [hereinafter TITLE IX
MANUAL].
23. 34 C.F.R. § 101.21.
24. In other words, if the funding agency had made the allegation of disparate impact
discrimination in Sandoval, instead of the private individuals affected by the discrimination,
those private individuals would not have been parties during the enforcement hearings.
25. 34 C.F.R. § 101.22(a).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at § 101.23. Furthermore, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) provides that: "Any person who
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The regulatory scheme set out in 34 C.F.R., part 101 is
elaborate. There are regulations for filing and service,' notice and
answers, 0 requests for hearings, 31 consolidation,3 2 motions and
petitions,3 3 determinations of authority,' evidence and crossexaminations, 35 objections,3 6 decisions and final decisions, 7 reviews
and appeals,'
expeditious treatment, 39 and posttermination
4
proceedings. ' These rules certainly create a system of adequate
administrative procedure for enforcing § 902. That begs the
questions, however, of whether such a system provides adequate
resources to enforce the § 902 regulations for every incident of
reported discrimination and whether providing a private right of
action was Congress' answer to the possibility of limited resources.
For example, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), "the primary
agency charged with administering Title IX," is not likely to enforce
Title IX regulations.4
Although OCR "has the authority to
terminate the federal funding of an institution that fails to comply
with Title IX or its regulations, it has never in its... history done
so. One suspects that the Bush Administration will not break this
precedent."4 2 The lack of initiative demonstrated by OCR, which
one may attribute to the assumption by the agency that a private
right of action existed to enforce Title IX regulations, nonetheless
highlights the need for private party enforcement where
government enforcement does not exist or is lacking. Allowing
private right of action to enforce § 902 enables those affected by
discrimination to utilize the legal resources of the private sector and
the many courts throughout the country.

believes himself or any specific class of individuals to be subjected to discrimination
prohibited by this part may by himself or by a representative file with the responsible
Department official or his designee a written complaint."
29. Id. at §§ 101.33-36.

30. 34 C.F.R. §§ 101.51-53.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
34
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at § 101.54.
at § 101.55.
at §§ 101.56-58.
C.F.R. §§ 101.61-63.
at §§ 101.72-79.
at § 101.81.
at §§ 101.92, 101.102, 101.104.
at §§ 101.86, 101.105-06.

39. 34 C.F.R. § 101.114.
40. Id. at § 101.121.
41. Grossman, supra note 14.
42. Id.
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SECTION TWO: MAJORITY OPINION IN SANDOVAL

This Section begins with a background discussion of the three
primary, and most disputed, cases at issue in Sandoval. The three
Supreme Court cases include GuardiansAssociationv. Civil Service
44
Commission of New York City,' Cannon v. University of Chicago,
and Lau v. Nichols.' The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Sandoval "found that a reading of Lau, Guardians,andAlexander,4 6
in pari materiasupported the finding of an implied private cause of
action under Section 602 of Title VI." 7 However, the Supreme
Court majority in Sandoval did not agree. Through a thorough
review of the legislative histories of Title VI and Title IX, the Court
in Cannon held that the two are virtually identical." The Court
agreed with this, thereby extending the holding in Sandoval from
Title VI to Title IX.49 We will therefore look at the significance of
these cases and how the Court in Sandoval dealt with each.
BACKGROUND TO GUARDIANS, CANNON, AND LAU

Guardians involved disparate impact discrimination against
black and Hispanic police officers in the hiring and firing process.50
In Guardians, the Court noted that § 602 "empowers agencies
providing federal financial assistance to issue 'rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
financial assistance .... .' 5 ' Furthermore, in Lau "Justice Stewart
explained that the regulations therefore should be upheld as valid,
because they were 'reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation.'"5 2 The holding, therefore, appeared to favor

43. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
44. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
45. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
46. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
47. TITLE IX MANUAL, supra note 22, at 152 (citing Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 507
(11th Cir. 1999) (this holding would be likewise applicable to § 902 of Title IX)).
48. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-99.
49. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694).
50. Guardians,463 U.S. at 582.
51. Id. at 592 n.12 (citing Lau, 414 U.S. at 571 (opinion concurring in the result) (quoting
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356,369 (1973); Thorpe v. Hous. Auth.
of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)).

52. Guardians,463 U.S. at 592 n.12 (citing Lau, 414 U.S. at 571 (opinion concurring in
the result) (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973);
Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)).
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the existence of an implied right of action for private parties to
enforce § 602."s
Cannon concerned the denial of admission by two private
university medical schools of applicants above a certain age. s' The
plaintiff argued that the schools' practice had a disparate impact
upon women applicants and brought an action to enforce § 902.'
While the Court did not find an implied private right of action to
enforce § 902 in this instance, as it did by implication four years
later in Guardians,the Court did find that courts should interpret
and apply Title IX in the same manner as Title VI.6
Lau involved the "failure of the San Francisco school system to
provide English language instruction to approximately 1,800
students of Chinese ancestry who d[id] not speak English.""7 The
Court found that the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, by § 602, was "authorized to issue rules, regulations, and
orders to make sure that recipients of federal aid under its
jurisdiction conduct any federally financed projects consistently
with § 601. " 8 In other words, the Court held that regulations
promulgated under § 602 were legitimate to effectuate § 601."9
MAJORITY'S FOUNDATION

We will begin by looking at what the majority took for granted
at the outset of its examination of § 602 in Sandoval. First, the
Court acknowledged that a definite link exists between Title VI and
Title IX.' The majority further conceded that "private individuals
may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief
and damages. " 61 The majority seemed to raise this point for no

53. This included § 902 by implication. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
54. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677.
55. Id. at 680-83.
56. Id. at 694-99.
57. Lau, 414 U.S. at 563.
58. Id. at 567.
59. The same applies to § 902 by extension of Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-99.
60. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-80 (citing Cannon,441 U.S. at 694) (While this admission
appears on its face to merely link the Sandoval case to the holding in Cannon, it is apparent,
and likely, that the majority's intent was to extend the holding in Sandoval to cases involving
Title IX.).
61. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-80 (arguing that Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845,42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 was a ratification of the holding in
Cannon, and that the Court validated this reading of § 2000d-7 in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County PublicSch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)).
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other reason than to highlight the difference in language between
§ 601 and § 602.62

Second, the majority stated that § 601 prohibits only intentional
discrimination, the intent requirement of which is analogous to §
901.' The majority wrote "Section 602 authorizes federal agencies
'to effectuate the provisions of [§ 6011 . . . by issuing rules,

regulations, or orders of general applicability."' Furthermore, the
issue in Sandoval arose when "the DOJ in an exercise of this
authority promulgated a regulation forbidding funding recipients to
'utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect
of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race,
color, or national origin .

"',6

*.

This relates directly to the

majority's third point, that "regulations promulgated under § 602 of
Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate
impact on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible
under § 601. "66 The language in § 601 only forbids intentional
discrimination, therefore the private right of action to enforce § 601
cannot extend to § 602; the Court's reasoning is that § 602 forbids
activity that § 601 allows.67
The majority quickly addressed the holdings in Cannon,
Guardians,and Lau. First, the majority argued that while Cannon
held "that Title IX created a private right of action to enforce its ban
on intentional discrimination,"' Cannon did not "consider whether
the [private] right [of action] reached regulations barring disparateimpact discrimination."69 Therefore, according to the Court, the
holding in Cannon does not address the issues considered in
Sandoval, nor any other case considering private right of action to
enforce § 602 or § 902.
The majority further argued that Guardiansmerely "held that
private individuals could not recover compensatory damages under
Title VI except for intentional discrimination." 9 Three of the five
Justice majority in Guardianswithheld judgment on the "question
of a direct private right of action to enforce the regulations"7
62. Likewise for § 901 and § 902.
63. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-81 (citing Choate, 469 U.S. at 293; Guardians,463 U.S. 61011; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272, 287 (1978)).
64. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1).
65. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2)).
66. Id. at 281.
67. Id. at 280-81.
68. Id. at 282.
69. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282.
70. Id. at 282-83 (emphasis in original).
71. Id. at 283.
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because it was not an issue presented by the case.72 Again, it is the
Court's contention that the holding in Guardiansdoes not reach the
issues presented in Sandoval.
Finally, the majority believes that after CentralBank,73 Lau is
no longer the law.7 4 The majority wrote "[iut is clear now that the
disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply § 601 - since they
indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits - and therefore clear that
the private right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private
right to enforce these regulations."7 5 Drawing on Central Bank to
overturn Lau, the majority asserted that the right to sue to enforce
disparate impact regulations "must come, if at all, from the
independent force of § 602. "7 The majority went further, stating
that if the Court assumes that § 602 grants the "authority to
promulgate disparate-impact regulations... the question remains
whether it confers a private right of action to enforce them. If not,
we must conclude that a failure to comply with regulations
promulgated under § 602 that is not also a failure to comply with
§ 601 is not actionable."7 7 The majority did just that.
DETERMINING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In light of the majority's systematic dismissal of the
precedential value of Cannon, Guardians,and Lau, the Court next
addressed the issue of where private rights and remedies come from.
First, the majority argued that "private rights of action to enforce
federal law must be created by Congress."78 The Court's point, it
seems, was that Congress must create a private right of action to
enforce § 602 or § 902, either explicitly or by authorizing a federal
agency. In other words, if Congress did not create a private right of
action to enforce § 602 or § 902, the federal agency could not create
that right on its own.
Second, the majority stated that "[tihe judicial task is to
interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it
displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a
private remedy."79 By this, the majority intended to limit the extent
72. Id. (citing Guardians,463 U.S. at 645 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
73. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
173 (1994).
74. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285-86.
75. Id. at 285.
76. Id. at 286.
77. Id. (footnote omitted).
78. Id. (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)).
79. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
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of the Court's search for intent to a reading of the statute itself.
This type of limitation largely negates inquiries into determinations
of congressional intent via legislative or judicial histories, and
denies a pragmatic approach to determining private rights of action.
Finally, the Court wrote that without a private remedy "a cause
of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter
how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible
with the statute." ° As is self-evident in that statement, Justice
Scalia and the majority have chosen a more narrowly focused path
to determine legislated rights. Therefore, using this three-tiered
inquiry of determining where those legislated rights come from, it
is apparent that the Court opted for an overall limited interpretive
scheme.
The majority further addressed the issue of determining
Congress's intent by looking at how past Courts have treated the
issue. Concerning speculation on Congress' understanding of how
the Court would interpret a statute at the time of the statute's
passage, the majority looks at two primary cases: Cort v. Ash"' and
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak.2 According to the majority
in Sandoval, the Court, in Cort,' abandoned the J.L Case Co. v.
Borak' view that to understand the intent of Congress in passing
certain legislation, one must understand the judicial environment
contemporary to that time.' The majority dramatized the Court's
position: "Having sworn offthe habit ofventuring beyond Congress's
intent, we will not accept respondents' invitation to have one last
86
drink."
The majority went on to disagree "with the Government that
our cases interpreting statutes enacted prior to Cort v. Ash have
given 'dispositive weight' to the 'expectations' that the enacting
Congress had formed 'in light of the contemporary legal context.'" 87
The majority of the Court claims that the "legal context matters
only to the extent it clarifies text."8 8 The majority, therefore, begins

U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979)).
80. Id. at 286-87 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145, 148 (1985);
TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, 444 U.S. at 23; Touche, 442 U.S. at 575-76).
81. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
82. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
83. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
84. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
85. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 287-88 (citing Brieffor United States at 14, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275
(2001)).
88. Id. at 288 (citing Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 784).
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and ends its "search for Congress's intent with the text and
structure of Title VI." One last drink indeed.
STRUCTURE OF TITLE VI

The majority drew three primary conclusions in writing for the

Court. First, the Court held that the text of § 602 requires that no
enforcement action be taken "until the department or agency
concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the

failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that
compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means"' and that"every
agency enforcement action is subject to judicial review." 91 The
majority went on to argue that this elaborate remedial scheme
"tend[s] to contradict a congressional intent to create privately
enforceable rights through § 602 itself. The express provision of one
method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress
intended to preclude others.'
Therefore, the Court held that
because the remedial scheme included in the statute itself is
thorough, it is unlikely that Congress would have also intended a
private right of remedial action.93
Second, the Court held that while regulations may invoke rights
present within a statute, those regulations may not create rights. 9'
The majority wrote that "[language in a regulation may invoke a
private right of action that Congress through statutory text created,
but it may not create a right that Congress has not."' The debate
in Sandoval, according to the majority, was not whether the statute
authorized the regulations, but whether the statute authorized the
regulations' creation of a private right of action to enforce § 602. 6
Justice Scalia, in writing for the majority, answered resoundingly
in the negative.9 7
Lastly, the Court held that silence on the part of Congress does
not equal approval of regulations that, in the majority's opinion,
went farther than the statutory text authorized. The majority
89. Id. (footnote omitted).
90. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1).
91. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1).
92. Id. at 290.
93. Id. The Court wrote, "[tihe express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive
rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others." See e.g., Karahalios v. Fed.
Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S.
77, 93-94 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979).
94. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.
95. Id. (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.18 (1979).
96. Id. (citing Touche, 442 U.S. at 577 n.18).
97. Id.
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wrote, "[ult is 'impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that
congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional
approval of the Court's statutory interpretation."9 8 The Court, with
this holding, has apparently made it increasingly difficult for parties
to prove the existence of an implied cause of action, under any
statute.
SECTION THREE: MINORITY OPINION IN SANDOVAL
In writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens began with the
presumption that "[alt the time of the promulgation of these
regulations, prevailing principles of statutory construction assumed
that Congress intended a private right of action whenever such a
cause of action was necessary to protect individual rights granted by
In the first part of that statement, the dissent
valid federal law.'
argued that an implied cause of action exists when a statute does
not provide for the protection of a right it creates, such as those
guaranteed by Title VI and Title IX. ° In the second part, the
dissent argued that Congress itself intended for the implied cause
of action to exist in Congress' contemplation and ratification, in
particular, of Title VI and Title IX.' ° ' To demonstrate these two
points, the dissent turned to the Court's treatment of this subject in
previous cases." 2
The dissent claimed that the Court had "already considered the
question presented today and concluded that a private right of
action exists."'0 3 The dissent wrote that "[rielying both on this
98. Id. at 292-93 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175, n.1 (1989)
(quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616,671-72 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
99. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 294.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The dissent argued that:
Just about every Court of Appeals has either explicitly or implicitly held that a
private right of action exists to enforce all of the regulations issued pursuant to
Title VI, including the disparate-impact regulations. For decisions holding so
most explicitly, see, e.g. Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387,400 (CA3 1999); Chester
Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 936-937 (CA3
1997), summarily dism'd, 524 U.S. 974 (1998); David K v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265,
1274 (CA7 1988); Sandoval v. Hogan [sic], 197 F.3d 484 (CAll 1999) (case
below). See also Latinos Unidos De Chelsea v. Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, 799 F.2d 774,785, n.20 (CA1 1986); New York Urban League, Inc.
v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (CA2 1995); Ferguson v. Charleston, 186 F.3d
469 (CA4 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Castaneda v.
Pickard, 781 F.2d 456,465, n.11 (CA5 1986); Buchanan v. Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352,
1356, n.5 (CA6 1996); Larry P.. [sic] v. Riles, 793 F. 2d 969,981-982 (CA9 1986);
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presumption and on independent analysis of Title VI, this Court has
repeatedly and consistently affirmed the right of private individuals
to bring civil suits to enforce rights guaranteed by Title VI.""
Among the cases to which the dissent referred are the three
primaries: Lau, Cannon, and Guardians.°5 The dissent argued that
"[wihen this Court faced an identical case 27 years ago, all the
Justices believed that private parties could bring lawsuits under
Title VI and its implementing regulations .

. . ."'

The dissent

therefore claimed that the issues in Lau were identical to the issues
before the Court in Sandoval, and that the holding should be the
same.* The dissent further argues that there was no disagreement
in the Court over Justice Stewart's analysis in Lau past the point
that Guardianswas decided. °7 The dissent argued that the holding
in Lau permitted private actions to enforce regulations promulgated
pursuant to § 602 and that the holding was not overturned by
Guardians.°" Therefore, in the dissent's view, case law permitted
the same private right of action in Sandoval as it did after Lau and
the majority should not have ignored the precedent.
In Cannon, the Court stated that "[wie have no doubt that
Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those
available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as
authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the
prohibited discrimination.""° As the dissent poignantly pointed out,
the Court referred to "[niot some of the prohibited discrimination,
but all of it.""0 In other words, the dissent suggested that Congress
explicitly ratified Title VI, and Title IX by extension, to ban all
discrimination, including that which is the most difficult to see:
disparate impact. Simply put, "[tihere is but one private action to
enforce Title VI, and we already know that such an action exists.""'
Along these lines, the dissent believed that an examination of
Title VI must begin with a look at the statute as an integrated
Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F. 3d 481, 486 (CA10 1996). No Court of Appeals has
ever reached a contrary conclusion. But cf. New York City Environmental
Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 72 (CA2 2000) (suggesting that the
question may be open).
Id. at 295 n.1.

104. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 294.
105. See supra notes 43-45.
106. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 296 (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)).
107. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (writing that according to the principal opinion in
Guardiansthere was no disagreement with Stewart's analysis in Lau).
108. Id.
109. Cannon,441 U.S. at 703.
110. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 297 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

111. Id. at 310 (footnote omitted).
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remedial scheme. The dissent wrote, "Section 601 does not stand in
isolation, but rather as part of an integrated remedial scheme.
Section 602 exists for the sole purpose of forwarding the
antidiscrimination ideals laid out in § 601.""112 In addition, for thirty
years the Court has "treated § 602 as granting the responsible
agencies the power to issue broad prophylactic rules aimed at
realizing the vision laid out in § 601, even if the conduct captured by
these rules is at times broader than that which would otherwise be
prohibited.""' In other words, not only did the dissent believe that
Congress empowered the aggrieved to sue for any type of
discrimination prohibited anywhere in Title VI and Title IX, but
also that the issue was a matter of stare decisis.1 4
The dissenting Justices believed that the majority was wrong
in three primary ways. First, "the Court provides a muddled
account of both the reasoning and the breadth of our prior decisions
endorsing a private right of action under Title VI, thereby obscuring
the conflict between those opinions and today's decision."" 5 Again,
the dissent was convinced that the Court should never have granted
certiorariin this case because the case law had settled the matter
over the thirty years following the passage of the Civil Rights Act." 6
Second, "the Court offers a flawed and unconvincing analysis of the
relationship between §§ 601 and 602 ... ignoring more plausible
and persuasive explanations detailed in our prior opinions.""' The
dissent believed that the Court should not have divided the private
right of action between intentional and disparate impact
discrimination, for Title VI prohibited both forms."' In other words,
the Court should view Title VI as a single prohibition of
discrimination for which there is a single private cause of action.
Third, "the Court badly misconstrues the theoretical linchpin of our
decision in Cannon... mistaking that decision's careful contextual
analysis for judicial fiat."" 9 Again, the dissent strongly disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of the case law and ignorance of
precedent.
The dissent further pointed to the Court's reluctance to
eliminate the possibility of a plaintiff asserting a private right of

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 304 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 305 (referring to Lau, Guardians,and Choate).
Id. at 301-02 (footnote omitted).
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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action under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12° Justice Stevens
wrote that requiring the use of § 1983 by plaintiffs to enforce the
regulations under § 602 is "something of a sport."' 2 ' Indeed, the
ability to sue under § 1983 to enforce the regulations under § 602
and § 902 would reduce this case to a mere procedural clarification;
a minor blip on the radar screen of civil rights advocates.
Furthermore, the dissent believed that the Court ignored the
122
importance of the "Chevron doctrine" in its analysis of Title VI.
The dissent wrote, "[iun most other contexts, when the agencies
charged with administering a broadly-worded statute offer
regulations interpreting that statute or giving concrete guidance as
to its implementation, we treat their interpretation of the statute's
breadth as controlling unless it presents an unreasonable
construction of the statutory text."' 23 The disagreement, as is
obvious, between the majority and the dissent lies in the
reasonability of the construction of the statutory text.
SECTION FOUR: APPLICATION OF THE CURRENT HOLDING IN
SANDOVAL TO TITLE IX
Currently there is no private right of action to enforce the
regulations under § 602. However, there has been much debate as
to whether the holding in Sandoval extends to private rights of
action to enforce § 902 and various other federal regulations."24 One
of the most recent and significant cases in which a defendant raised
the Sandoval holding as a defense to a private suit to enforce § 902
is Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic
Association.'2 5 In this case:
Plaintiffs bring this suit against the Michigan High School
Athletic Association and its Representative Council, alleging
that they have been excluded from opportunities to participate
in interscholastic athletic programs and have received unequal
treatment and benefits in these programs. They contend that
this putative exclusion and unequal treatment constitute gender
discrimination, in violation of (1) Title IX of the Education
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002) (see discussion infra Section Five).

121. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 300.
122. Id. at 309 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
123. Id.
124. See supra,notes 14-15.
125. Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:98-CV-479 (W.D.
Mich. Jul. 12, 2001) (order granting in part and denying in part motion to dismiss).
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Amendments of 1972; (2) the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 37.2302
and 37.2402. The alleged discrimination is made manifest,
according to Plaintiffs, in MHSAA's: (1)refusing to sanction girls
ice hockey and water polo; (2) requiring that the Plaintiff Class
play its sports in non-traditional seasons; (3) operating shorter
athletic seasons for some girls' sports than for boys' sports; (4)
scheduling the competitions of the Plaintiff Class on inferior
dates; (5) providing, assigning, and operating inferior athletic
facilities to the Plaintiff Class in which to play MHSAAsanctioned games; (6) requiring that the Plaintiff Class play
some sports under rules and/or conditions different from those
in the NCAA or other governing organizations, unlike boys; and
(7) allocating more resources for the support and promotion of
male interscholastic
athletic programs than for female
12 6
programs.

The district court in Communitiesfor Equity granted the portion of
the motion to dismiss on the ground that a private party can no
longer sue to enforce the regulations under § 902 after Sandoval.'2 7
The court stated that "Plaintiffs' argument that Sandoval applies
only to Title VI is without merit"12 and that "Sandoval must be
applied to the instant case.""2 The court therefore held that
"following Sandoval, a private right of action to enforce the
regulations found in § 902 does not exist; that is, Plaintiffs cannot
maintain a private right of action insofar as their Amended
Complaint contains disparate impact claims." 30 The significance of
Communities for Equity is that it appears to be the first sign that
the federal courts are willing to follow the Sandoval decision in Title
IX lawsuits.
Another district court took the holding in Sandoval a step
further. In Litman v. George Mason University, 3 ' the plaintiff
brought an action pursuant to Title IX "alleging that a statecontrolled university's administration and faculty retaliated against
a student for filing a discrimination complaint."3 2 Prior to the
Sandoval decision "this Court upheld Ms. Litman's private right of
126. Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:98-CV-479, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5780, at 2-3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 1999).
127. Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:98-CV-479, at 3, 5
(W.D. Mich. Jul. 12, 2001).
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id.
131. 156 F. Supp. 2d 579 (E.D. Va. 2001).
132. Id.
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action to bring a Title IX retaliation claim."1"3 However, after
Sandoval the defendant moved to dismiss the Title IX claim.'" The
court held that "34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) is a procedural provision
detailing how to conduct an investigation, not a valid interpretation
of 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Thus, M6. Litman's right to enforce the antiretaliation regulation must come, if at all, from the independent
force of section 1682. "1" The court goes further to state that:
In the aftermath of Sandoval, the Court finds that section 1682
conveys no such independent right of action. Section 1682, like
section 602 in the Title VI context, merely authorizes the agency
to "effectuate" the rights guaranteed by section 1681; the
operative language Sandoval found not to create a right of action
to enforce the challenged Title VI regulation, language which is
essentially identical in Title VI and Title IX, likewise does not
create a private right of action in this case.136
Therefore, the "implied private right of action to seek redress for
harm suffered because of discrimination does not extend to harm
suffered because of retaliation, because .

.

. the anti-retaliation

regulation is not merely an interpretation of Section 1681 but
expands the scope of prohibited conduct."'37
In Litman, the court extended the holding in Sandoval to the
"anti-retaliation" portion of the Title IX regulations. 3 ' The court's
conclusion was resounding:
In the wake of Sandoval, the private right of action in such cases
extends only to the substantive provisions contained in the
statutes themselves, or to valid interpretive regulations. Thus,
an individual may no longer bring suit to enforce effectuating
regulations enacted pursuant139to Title IX that expand the scope
of prohibited discrimination.
The significance of this holding is that it appears to be the first sign
that federal courts are willing to further the Sandoval decision
beyond the scope addressed in the decision itself; that is, to
eradicate all private right of action under both Title VI and Title IX
133. Id. at 580.
134. The relevant Title IX regulation is 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e).
135. Litman, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 585 (citations and footnote omitted) (§§ 1681 and 1682 are
analogous to §§ 901 and 902, respectively).
136. Id. at 585-86 (footnote omitted).
137. Id. at 586.
138. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e).
139. Litman, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
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to enforce any regulations, not merely those addressed in Sandoval.
Furthermore, in allowing recipients to retaliate, which by its nature
is an intentional act, against beneficiaries who bring complaints
under § 902, the court is effectively allowing recipients to
circumvent the prohibition of intentional discrimination under §
901.
The courts in these two cases are constructing decisions directly
from the 5-4 holding in Sandoval. While the cases paint a grim
picture for civil rights advocates, they do not necessarily eradicate
all opportunities for the aggrieved to enforce or have enforced the
regulations promulgated under Title VI and Title IX for disparate
impact discrimination.
SECTION

FIVE:

OPTIONS FOR PLAINTIFFS IN THE SANDOVAL ERA

This section will address two primary means by which the
aggrieved can ensure that the effectuating regulations enacted
pursuant to Title VI or Title IX are enforced, whether directly or
indirectly."4 The first topic will be the existing procedural process.
The second topic will be the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
THE PROCEDURAL PROCESS

After Sandoval, aggrieved parties still have the ability to file
complaints as part of the procedural process. However, this is very
taxing on the limited resources of the Civil Rights agencies charged
with this task, it is often an extremely slow process, and the process
does not provide individual plaintiffs with remedies.'
Furthermore, there is no private right for the aggrieved party to sue
these agencies, as part of the federal government, for failing to
4
enforce Title IX.1'

The case law, as an administrative matter,

pushes the aggrieved party further from the enforcement, in which
the party is likely to have a stake. Also, the federal government, in
pursuing a claim of disparate impact discrimination, is not acting on
behalf of the aggrieved party, but is instead acting solely in the
interest of the United States and the funding agency." Plaintiffs,
140. This section will not address the possibility of congressional action to alter existing
statutes to overturn the holding in Sandoval, for it is beyond the scope of this Note.
141. Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce Title Vrs Section 602 Regulations, 49 U.
KAN. L. REv. 321, 322 n.7 (2001).
142. See Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1999);
Wash. Legal Found. v. Alexander, 984 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Women's Equity Action
League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
143. The training manual, which is provided by the DOJ, reads:
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therefore, are in the unfortunate position
unrepresented in the procedural process.

137
of remaining

42 U.S.C. § 1983
Those aggrieved parties that want to pursue a private right of
action to enforce the regulations under § 902 may wish to sue under

42 U.S.C. § 1983.144 Justices Scalia and Stevens each laid down
opposing strongholds in Sandoval, but something was missing that
could have been an even greater blow to civil rights advocates. The
majority barely addressed the possibility that a plaintiff could bring

a § 1983 suit to enforce the regulations under § 602,"4 whereas the
dissent actively endorsed the idea. 46 Whether this was due in part
to pandering by Justice Scalia to secure a majority is unclear, but
the unanswered question remains: Can a private party bring a §
1983 action and sue under the regulations to enforce § 602 and §
902?147

The Department of Justice has two roles to play in Title IX enforcement:
coordination of federal agency implementation and enforcement, and legal
representation of the United States and the funding agency .... [The DOJI may
seek injunctive relief, specific performance, or other remedies when agencies
have referred determinations of noncompliance by recipients to the Department
for judicial enforcement. Such litigation will be assigned to the [Justice]
Department's Civil Rights Division.
TITLE IX MANUAL, supra note 22, at 163, 165. See also 34 C.F.R. § 101.21 (defining parties).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002) reads:
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
Id.
145. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284.
146. In fact, the dissent notes that:
Litigants who in the future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state
actors in all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to obtain relief; indeed, the
plaintiffs in this case (or other similarly situated individuals) presumably retain
the option of rechallenging Alabama's English-only policy in a complaint that
invokes § 1983 even after today's decision.
Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. See Lisa E. Key, PrivateEnforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983:
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One case that was important to the dissent in Sandoval was
Powell v. Ridge.' Powell concerned a suit in which the plaintiffs
claimed that the "practices of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
in funding public education [had] a racially discriminatory effect."' 49
In Powell, the court held "that a § 1983 suit is not incompatible with
Title VI and the Title VI regulation." 50 The following will help
determine how far the holding in Powell will go for civil rights
advocates.
ENFORCEMENT OF A STATUTORY RIGHT V.
IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION

One debate surrounding the enforcement of Title IX regulations
via § 1983 involves the difference between enforcement of § 902 as
a statutory right and enforcement through an implied right of
action. The Court "has recognized that courts should use a 'different
inquiry' in deciding whether a statutory 'right' may be enforced
under § 1983 than in determining if there is an implied private right
of action based on the same underlying statute and right." 5 ' The
question is a matter of burden:
To imply a private right of action, courts place an increasingly
difficult burden on a plaintiff to prove that Congress intended to
allow private suits under a particular substantive statute.
Conversely, once a court recognizes that a federal statute creates

a distinct "right" and that the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary

of that right, there is a presumption that the right is enforceable
under § 1983. The burden is then on the defendant to show that
Congress expressly prohibited a suit under § 1983 or implicitly
did so by enacting a comprehensive remedial scheme that is
152
incompatible with a § 1983 suit.
Therefore, it is easier for a plaintiff to argue and a court to find that
(1) Congress did not intend for § 1983 to not apply; and (2) the
The Supreme Court'sFailureto Adhere to the Doctrine of Separationof Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 283 (1996); Mank, supra note 141; Todd E. Pettys, The IntendedRelationshipBetween
Administrative Regulations and Section 1983's "Laws", 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (1998);
Michael A. Zwibelman, Comment, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims, 65
U. CH. L. REV. 1465 (1998).
148. Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999).
149. Id. at 391.
150. Id. at 403.
151. Mank, supra note 141, at 323 (citing Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358-64 (1992);
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990)).

152. Mank, supra note 141, at 323-24 (citations omitted).

20021

SOMETHING OF A SPORT

regulations were merely an interpretation of the statute, than to
imply a private right of action.
Whether a regulation is an interpretation of a statute, and not
rights-creating itself, has been a difficult question for courts to deal
with."5 There is a split amongst the circuit courts: "Some circuits
allow § 1983 suits based on rights created by regulations issued by
agencies acting under delegated congressional authority. However,
in other circuits, regulations may only help define the scope of a
statutory right created by Congress, and may not serve as an
independent basis for § 1983 suits.""5 Regardless, to be successful
in a § 1983 suit a plaintiff must show that "Congress intended to
create a right for the benefit of the plaintiff."5 5 In other words, for
there to be a § 1983 action to enforce the regulations under § 902,
Congress must have intended to create a "right" for the benefit of
the private plaintiff bringing suit when it enacted Title IX.
The "right" operates as the basis for the § 1983 suit; without the
"right," there is nothing for the plaintiff to enforce and no basis for
the suit.'5 6 This is the crux of the § 1983 discourse for two reasons.
First, as mentioned, if § 902 does not create a "right"for the plaintiff
there is likely no basis for a § 1983 suit. Second, if § 902 does create
a "right" that benefits the plaintiff for purposes of§ 1983, the courts
must determine whether Congress157intended for a plaintiff to sue
under § 1983 to enforce that right.
There is a split in the circuits as to whether regulations alone
can create rights enforceable under § 1983. The Sixth and Third
Circuits both agree that regulations can create § 1983 enforceable
rights. The Sixth Circuit has held that "federal regulations may
independently create enforceable § 1983 rights if the regulations
establish 'rights' under the same three-part test used to determine
whether a statute gives rise to a § 1983 cause of action." 5 ' The
Third Circuit stated in dicta that "valid federal regulations as well
as federal statutes may create rights enforceable under section
1983."159
153. See Pettys, supra note 147, at 73-82.
154. Mank, supranote 141, at 324 (citing Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1007-12 (11th Cir.
1997); Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1994)).
155. Mank, supra note 141, at 326.

156. For a more thorough discussion of the term "right," see Mank, supra note 141, at 33036.
157. It is self-evident that Congress intended for this type of situation to be actionable
under a plain reading of § 1983.
158. Mank, supra note 141, at 346 (citing Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 552-53).
159. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Wright v. City
of Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987); Alexander v. Polk,
750 F.2d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 1984)).
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The D.C. and Tenth Circuits are still somewhat on the fence but
"have suggested that a federal regulation may create a right
enforceable under § 1983 if the regulation has the 'force and effect
of law' under Chrysler Corp. v. Brown.""0 The D.C. Circuit wrote
that "where Congress directs regulatory action, we believe that the
substantive federal regulations issued under Congress' mandate
constitute 'laws' within the meaning of section 1983. We therefore
hold that the plaintiffs state a valid section 1983 claim for the
defendants' alleged violation of HUD's grievance procedure
regulations."'' In dicta, the Tenth Circuit court stated "that '[in at
least some instances, violations of rights provided under federal
regulations provide a basis for § 1983 suits.'"'62 Both Circuits
appear to agree that regulations alone can sometimes create rights
enforceable under § 1983, but the tests these Circuits use are more
stringent than those the Third and Sixth Circuits employ.
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, "have
concluded that regulations may not independently establish rights
under § 1983. " 163 The Fourth Circuit,

citing the dissenting opinion in Wright, has declared that "[an
administrative regulation . . .cannot create an enforceable

§ 1983 interest not already implicit in the enforcing statute."
However, even when they do not allow regulations alone to serve
as the sole basis for a § 1983 action, courts often recognize that
regulations can play a role in interpreting or explicating rights
implicit in an underlying statute. 164
The Eleventh Circuit, in Harrisv. James, stated that to the extent
that the Supreme Court "conclude [s] federal rights must ultimately
emanate from either explicit or implicit statutory requirements, we
would seem to be in agreement with the Fourth Circuit. However,
we are uncertain whether the Fourth Circuit would agree with our
conclusion that regulations may further define rights imposed by
federal statutes."65 In this case there appears to be even further
160. Mank, supra note 141, at 347 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-03
(1979); Pettys, supra note 147, at 78-79).
161. Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 608 n.1, 638 n.6; Polk, 750 F.2d at 259-61; Cunningham v. Toan, 728
F.2d 1101, 1103-05 (8th Cir. 1984) vacated by 469 U.S. 1154 (1985); Billington v. Underwood,
613 F.2d 91, 93-94 (5th Cir. 1980)).
162. Mank, supra note 141, at 348 (citing DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,
844 F.2d 714, 724 n.19 (10th Cir. 1988); Pettys, supra note 147 at 79 n.177).
163. Mank, supra note 141, at 348.
164. Id. at 348 (citing Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987)).
165. Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1009 n.21 (11th Cir. 1997).
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dissension between the two Circuits. However, the Eleventh Circuit
insisted that the "nexus between the regulation and Congressional
intent" not be too tenuous. 16
WHETHER CONGRESS CREATED AN ENFORCEABLE "RIGHT" IN §

902

Through various decisions, the Court has set up a three-part
17
test to determine whether Congress created an enforceable right.
The test reads:
First, a statute must clearly impose a binding obligation.
Second, Congress must intend that the statute in question
benefit the plaintiff. Third, "[tihe interest the plaintiff asserts
must not be 'too vague and amorphous' to be 'beyond the
competence of the judiciary to enforce.'" If the plaintiff
demonstrates that the statute in question meets the three-part
test, then a rebuttable presumption arises that an enforceable
statutory "right" exists under § 1983.161
In applying this three-part test to Title IX, the future of § 902 is not
apparent. Certainly, § 902 imposes a binding obligation to satisfy
the first part of the test. 69 The third part of the test also seems
straightforward: the interest of the beneficiaries does not appear to
be vague or amorphous at all, for the statute prohibits the recipient
of federal funds from discriminating against those parties.
Furthermore, the statute is not "beyond the competence of the
judiciary to enforce" because the aggrieved may bring a private
action if the discrimination is intentional.
166. Id. at 1010 (arguing further that "determining the validity of the regulation would
require application of the analysis set out in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984).").
167. Mank, supra note 141, at 332-33 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41
(1997); Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509; Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S.
103, 106 (1989); Pettys, supra note 147, at 68-69; Recent Cases, Civil Rights - Availability of
1983 Remedy - Eleventh Circuit Holds That FederalRegulations Requiring State Medicaid
Plans To Provide Transportationto and from ProvidersDo Not Create a Right Enforceable
Under§ 1983. -Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REV. 2444,2446
n.28 (1998)).
168. Id. at 332-33.
169. In pertinent part, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2002) reads:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity... is authorized and
directed to effectuate the provisions of section 901 with respect to such program
or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which
shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing
the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
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The second part of the test, however, poses greater concern. As
discussed earlier, the aggrieved are not parties to the procedural
process. Does this mean that Congress did not intend Title IX to
benefit the aggrieved? If so, the aggrieved would have no claim to
the "right" for purposes of § 1983. The United States and the
funding agencies could be the only parties intended to benefit from
the statute for purposes of § 1983. On the other hand, it also
appears that Congress intended the aggrieved to be beneficiaries of
Title IX; they are the individuals Congress intended to protect by
the statute.
To further complicate the inquiry, even after the "plaintiff
meets the three-part test, a defendant may rebut the presumption
that § 1983 is available by demonstrating that Congress intended
to bar access to § 1983 . . . by explicitly foreclosing private

enforcement of the statute, or by enacting a comprehensive remedial
scheme that is incompatible with separate enforcement under §
1983. " "17 However, the "Court has emphasized that once a court

finds an enforceable right under the three-part test, there is a
strong presumption against preclusion and in favor of enforcing
those federal rights under § 1983."1'
The three-part test is "significantly easier to meet than the
four-part test the Court uses to determine whether Congress
specifically intended to allow a private cause of action under the
same underlying substantive statute."'72 In light of Sandoval, in
which the Court held that there is not an implied right of action to
enforce § 602, the question whether Congress created a "right" in §
902 will be determinative for the future of private suits to enforce
the regulations under § 902.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval delivered a shocking
blow to civil rights activists across the country. While the decision
was a setback for private litigation of § 902 claims, it certainly did
not sound the death knell for disparate impact civil rights law.
Options remain for aggrieved beneficiaries and there is still room for
creative lawyering.
First, the regulations and procedures are still in place. The
Court did not dismantle either of these in the Sandoval decision.
170. Id. at 334 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 20 (1981)).
171. Id. at 334 (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520 (1990)).
172. Mank, supra note 141, at 333.
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However, the limited resources of the various government agencies
charged with reviewing complaints inhibit the agencies' ability to
police every instance of a § 902 violation. While not every complaint
will lead to proper enforcement, at least a portion of them will.
Second, there is still a private right of action if the
discrimination is intentional. Again, this was uncontested in
Sandoval. An aggrieved beneficiary will have the opportunity to
prosecute a recipient's violation of § 901. However, as mentioned,
the court in Litman ruled that intentionalretaliation by a recipient
against a complainant beneficiary following the filing of a § 902
complaint will not lead to a private right of action for the
beneficiary. Unfortunately, this exception, if sustained by higher
courts, will provide a way for recipients to circumscribe the § 901
prohibition against intentional discrimination.
Third, the Court has not yet decisively ruled on whether an
aggrieved party can sue using § 1983 to enforce the regulations
under § 902. The Court left the backdoor open for prospective §
1983 lawsuits by not presenting a holding on the issue. While §
1983 was mentioned in passing by the majority, and in-depth by the
dissent, both sides wrote in dictum. The Court will determine the
future of the private right of action if, and when, it rules on whether
§ 902 creates an enforceable right, instead of an implied right of
action. The Court appears to have answered the latter question of
an implied right of action in Sandoval.
The majority's ignorance of precedent as a disservice to law, not
merely justice, outweighs the flaws of its strict interpretation of
congressional intent. The Court's holding however, not its dictum,
still allows creative attorneys the ability to bring § 902 lawsuits
under the auspices of § 1983. A determination by the Court as to
whether § 902 is an enforceable right will largely guide this debate
in the future. However, the majority's muffled expressions on the
§ 1983 issue indicate that there are not five votes for a ruling
against the § 1983 option; thus, the sport lives on.

